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Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Schnieder, Benjamin |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger'',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because''. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen's argument fails. |
| Starting Page | 409 |
| Ending Page | 428 |
| Page Count | 20 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000016484.52149.52 |
| Volume Number | 117 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://eppe.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/compatibilism-philstud.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1023/B%3APHIL.0000016484.52149.52 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
