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the Justification of Punishment
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Cragg, Wesley |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | Historically, discussions of the morality of punishment have been dominated by the conviction that punishment is an inescapable feature of social life. Thus it is widely believed that laws will not be respected unless those who break them are punished. Yet another view deeply entrenched is that avoiding or mitigating pain and suffering ought to be a fundamental goal of civilized societies. These two convictions are in obvious tension. Punishment requires the deliberated infliction of pain or suffering. How then can it be justified? There are two familiar ways of seeking to overcome this tension. Some have argued that the punishment of those who break the law is justified because justice requires it, a view known as retributivism. Others have argued that punishment is needed for purposes of social protection. On this latter view, where its use results in a reduction of pain and suffering experienced by those falling under the authority of a legal system, punishment is justified. This approach evaluates punishment by reference to its consequences or its utility. For most of this century, retributivism has held little appeal at least among those people whose ideas have directly influenced sentencing policy. They have for the most part seen forward-looking justifications of punishment as "more civilized than arguments based on revenge and retribution."' Of even more significance, however, is the fact that now forward-looking or utilitarian justifications are widely seen as equally suspect. The criticisms here are double pronged. First, forward-looking accounts of punishment allow only a secondary role for principles of justice and responsibility. They also require subordinating the interests of those being punished to the welfare of others. As a consequence, they ignore the Kantian principle that human beings should be treated as ends and never as means only. Second, empirical research in the last two decades suggests that forward-looking sentencing practices have simply failed to achieve their objectives. There is little reliable evidence that punishment is an effective deterrent. Neither has rehabilitation-oriented sentencing had for the most part its desired results. The result of this process of evaluation seems to be a widely shared view at least among those responsible for advising on sentencing policy that neither of the traditional justifications of punishment is adequate taken by itself. Retributive accounts are unacceptable because they suggest that where serious wrongdoing has occurred, punishment may be justified and even required even |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0841820900000825 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
