Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Monism versus Pluralism : Where to Begin ?
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Wright, Cory D. Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | According to (inv), discursive differences in the standards of justification, semantic content, explanatory posits, and other such features make no difference to the underlying nature of truth; for it does not vary according to them. Statements about elephants and eggshells, if true, are true in the same way that statements about loose morals, the illegality of littering, or the laughability quotient of your-mama jokes. The nature of truth is uniform across sectors of discourse. Debates between monists and pluralists, who take truth to be many, have usually played out as a tussle over the invariance principle. Objections to it have been leveraged by several truth-theorists— including Wright, Putnam, Lynch, Sher, and Horgan—some of whom have advanced an opposing, variance principle. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.nikolajpedersen.com/papers/WrightPedersenNewWavesTruth.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
