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L'établissement de liens sociaux durables favorise la coopération dans le Dilemme du Prisonnier itéré
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | St-Pierre, Angèle |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | Reciprocal altruism, which represents the most probable explanation for cooperation among non-kin, has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma. According to this game, cooperation should evolve when individuals, who expect to play again, IJse conditional strategies like Generous TIt-For-Tat or Pavlov. Up to now, most experimental studies with non-human animais have failed to find cooperation in control/ed payoff games, because animais apparently discount the future for Immediate payoffs. Contrary to this hypothesis, this study shows that zebra finches can maintain high levels of cooperation when they interact with a partner with whom they have established long-term social bonds, and so even though they have limited memory capacities. Hence, our results contradict the idea that reciprocal altnJÎsm is rare because of its required specialized cognitive abilities, meaning that it may be more common in nature than previously thought. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/8148/St-Pierre_Angele_2008_memoire.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
