Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Lehrer, Ehud Pauzner, Ady |
| Copyright Year | 1995 |
| Abstract | When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained by equilibria if the players are sufficiently patient. Neither of these facts generalizes to the case of different time preferences. First, players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time. Hence, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Second, it is not usually the case that every trade plan that guarantees individually rational payoffs can be sustained by an equilibrium, no matter how patient the players are. This paper provides a simple characterization of the sets of Nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games. * We wish to thank Jonny Shalev, Jeroen Swinkels and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. We especially thank Itzhak Gilboa for his valuable help. An earlier version of the paper was circulated as: “Breaking the Barriers of the Feasible Set: On Repeated Games with Different Time Preferences”. ** A number of (less central) proofs were moved, because of space limitations, from this paper to Lehrer and Pauzner (1997). Word 6.0 and pdf versions of that paper can be downloaded from _______________. 1 School of Mathematical Sciences, Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978 and Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management ,Northwestern University. e-mail: lehrer@math.tau.ac.il 2 Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. e-mail: ady@econ.tau.ac.il |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.tau.ac.il/~pauzner/papers/repeated.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Convex hull Email Feasible region Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Large Nash equilibrium Patients Portable Document Format Science Social Sciences Version |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
