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Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Anderson, Axel Smith, Lones |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in Becker (1973) . This failure holds around the highest (lowest) reputation agents for "high skill" ("low skill") technologies. We find that matches of likes eventually dissolve. In another life-cycle finding, young workers are paid less than their marginal product, and old workers more. Also, wages rise with tenure but need not reflect marginal products: information rents produce non-monotone and discontinuous wage profiles. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell. |
| Starting Page | 3 |
| Ending Page | 29 |
| Page Count | 27 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00567.x |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://faculty.georgetown.edu/aza/ReputationalMatching.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00567.x |
| Volume Number | 77 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |