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Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Moreira, Humberto Araujo, Aloisio Filho, Luciano I. De Castro |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | We give necessary and sui¬ƒcient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an exogenous and explicit tie breaking mechanism. As a basis for these results, we obtain a characterization lemma that is valid under a general setting, that includes non-independent types, asymmetrical utilities and any attitude towards risk. Such characterization gives a basis for an intuitive interpretation for the behavior of the bidder: to bid in order to equalize the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of bidding |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/1010/1745.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://epge.fgv.br/files/1608.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7355156.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |