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Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Horie, Shinya |
| Copyright Year | 2017 |
| Abstract | This paper considers a situation in which a corrupt government official does not commit to using the common corruption scheme called right of first refusal in a procurement auction. Under the right of first refusal, the contractors (or bidders) participate in a sequential auction, and there is no inefficiency in project allocation. However, in cases in which the scheme is not practiced, both contractors participate in a simultaneous auction, and the disadvantaged contractor bids more aggressively than the advantaged contractor. I found that such uncertainty regarding the practice of corruption schemes can lead to inefficiency, even when the corruption scheme itself is not practiced. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Volume Number | 1710 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/repository/81009781.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
