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Matching Markets with Signals NOTA DI LAVORO 39
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kushnir, Alexey |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between rms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Speci cally, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the total number of matches and the welfare of rms, as well as it a¤ects ambiguously the welfare of workers. These results run contrary to previous ndings that costless signaling facilitates match formation. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/50730/2/39-09.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |