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Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Wright, Crispin |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | The setting of relativistic ideas about truth in the general style of semantic-theoretic apparatus pioneered by Lewis, Kaplan and others has persuaded many that they should at least be taken seriously as competition in the space of explanatory linguistic theory, a type of view which properly formulated, may offer an at least coherent — and indeed, in the view of some, a superior —account of certain salient linguistic data manifest in, for example, discourse about epistemic modals, about knowledge and about matters of taste and value, and may also offer the prospect of a coherent regimentation of the Aristotelian "Open Future" (along with, perhaps, the Dummettian 'anti-real' past.) My main purpose here to enter a reminder of certain underlying philosophical issues about relativism — about its metaphysical coherence, its metasemantic obligations, and the apparent limitations of the kind of local linguistic evidence which contemporary proponents have adduced in its favour —of which there is a risk that its apparent rehabilitation in rigorous semantic dress may encourage neglect. |
| Starting Page | 157 |
| Ending Page | 186 |
| Page Count | 30 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0007 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/wright/Wright-Crispin-relativism.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso%2F9780199234950.003.0007 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
