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Truth-making: What it is not and What it Could be
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Caputo, Stefano |
| Copyright Year | 2007 |
| Abstract | By the end of the seventies the rise and fall of the correspondence theory of truth in contemporary philosophy seemed to be of interest only to historians of philosophy. Having emerged in works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, correspondence theory had already begun to fall out of favour after Frege‟s identification of facts and true propositions; it later met its ruin, first with Wittegenstein‟s criticism of the tractarian conception of language, then with Strawson‟s questioning of the existence of facts in his attack on Austin‟s version of the correspondence theory and finally with the stones launched by Davidson‟s slingshot against the distinctness of facts 1 . Correspondence theory seemed to have been superseded on the one hand by more refined Tarski-style definitions of truth-predicates, and on the other by the growth of the deflationist stance rooted in the work of Ramsey 2 . |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1515/9783110326918.275 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://philpapers.org/archive/CAPTWI-2.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110326918.275 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
