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What Happened to Battlefield Air Interdiction? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre-Desert Storm to 2001
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | McCaffrey, Terrance J. |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | Abstract : The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction (BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. These targets were beyond the capability and immediate tactical concern of the ground commander, beyond the area that required detailed coordination of each individual CAS mission, but were close enough to have a near-term effect upon surface operation and required a general coordination of both air and ground operations. These became known as intermediate targets, and often considered shallow interdiction targets closer to the front lines than the traditional interdiction targets commonly tasked by and under the control of the air forces. The Air Force and Army worked hand in glove through the seventies to refine and publish battlefield doctrine, best recognized under its Army label, AirLand Battle. Through the eighties Gen Wilbur L. Creech, Tactical Air Command commander, Gen Donald Starry, chief of Army Training and Doctrine Command, and other service leaders worked on a series of historical compromises pertaining to all aspects of the Army-Air Force operations. Not more than 10 years later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its air tasking orders. Indeed, the term BAI was removed from doctrinal manuals written after 1990. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III traces air-ground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I through the decade after Operation Desert Storm. Lt Col McCaffrey concludes that there is still need for a BAI-type mission. This study illuminates the process that will lead to renew BAI even as the struggle for service missions continue to cause self-interested debate. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a575998.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
