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Management of new Information Technologies in Organisations by Intelligent Software Agents
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Abolfazlian, A. R. Kian |
| Copyright Year | 1996 |
| Abstract | In this paper, we entertain the notion of Management of new Information Technologies in Organisations by Intelligent Software Agents. We start by reconsidering the psychology of an organisation by taking a Post-Cartesian approach based on Activity Theory. We consider an organisation as an entity that dynamically interacts with its constituents. We show how one can describe the dynamic process of concept development by considering both parts, i.e. both the individual constituents and the interaction among them. This will in a very natural manner explain how the introduction of new Technologies in Organisations can produce new concepts. Upon this we introduce the notion of Intelligent Software Agents (ISAs) as autonomous, social, reactive, proactive and subservient software computer systems. Organisations are introduced to new Technology as a natural consequence of the ever continuous stream of new tasks within the boundaries of organisations. We not only use and invent our newly acquired technologies to deal with our new tasks but in the same time and in duration of the same process we ourselves are changed by the very same instruments and the consequences of using them. We show how we, in the case of information technologies, can use this fact to get a better understanding of management of these technologies by using Intelligent Software Agents. Post-Cartesian Management When working on organisational behaviour issues, we often project the metaphors of the present-day mainstream psychology in the management sciences. By doing this our description of for instance the development of new concepts in an organisation inherits the limits of the psychology we use. Thus the psychology of an organisation usually mirrors the same p tt rns of weaknesses as the mainstream psychology. Of course what the mainstream means is very much dependant of where the analysis takes place. Much of the present-day mainstream psychology, especially cognitive psychology, can be characterised as being Cartesian. One of the simplest and most accurate ways of describing Descartes’ psychology is the three moment model characterisation of it. This model comprises a sensory Input mechanism, brain or Central-Processing mechanism (CPM), and a response Output mechanism. The basic three moment model is both mechanical and representationalist, and is governed by the principles of the efficient mechanical causation. Cognitive psychology is the most obvious example of this type of psychology (Abolfazlian 1996b). Cartesian psychology is criticised by many and have many limitations. For instance, this psychology manifests itself in subject-object dualism , a radical separation of the inner f om the outer, of the world of experience from that of physical existence. As a consequence of this the unit of analysis of Cartesian psychology, whether human beings or an organisation are reduced to passive receivers of the sensory inputs. All the cognitive processes take place in the CPM. The only way in which the outer objects can interfere with the occurrence of cognitive processes is through the sensory impressions whose nature is not the same as that of the objects themselves. Using these types of psychology while considering the development of new concepts caused by the introduction of new technology in organisations, we face a big challenge that goes whole the way to the boundaries of what can be described in the framework of e.g. cognitive psychology. The separation of the outer objects, in this case the new technology, and the cognitive processes underlying the development of the new concept, makes it almost impossible to show why the replacement of the old technology with the new one causes changes in the organisation, especially when the new technology offers every single aspect of the old one. There have been many attempts to overcome this subject-object dualism. Any Psychology based on social constructivism (Berger et. al., 1966) or Activity Theory (Wertsch, 1979) can be seen as some examples of the known approaches that have succeeded in getting rid of this dualism. In the core of these types of psychology lie the recognition of the social aspect of cognition. In the following we take a position based on Activity Theory (Abolfazlian, 1996b; Wertsch, 1979). Human beings “are socially constructed. What we mean, how we see the world, our values and valuables are all produced, learnt or acquired by and through interacting with others. Our means of communication such as natural languages cannot be learnt without this kind of interaction. Social norms defining the acceptable or appropriate ways to behave and opinions to hold make the boundaries within which we acquire and develop our behaviour and behavioural patterns. Without these norms, we imply cannot maintain our ways of communication, which are in the core of our existence as species ” (Abolfazlian, 1996a). On the other hand the very same History, Culture and society that are supposed to have shaped us to what and who we are, are produced by us. We define what society, culture and history is as much as they define us. We shall see how the projection of this metaphor in the management sciences, i.e. considering an organisation as an entity that is partially defined by its constituents — employees, tools, technologies, etc. — and that equally defines its constituents, can give us a better understanding of the development of the new concepts in organisations, especially when the introduction of new IT is involved. A key factor towards this goal is the concept of psychological tools or Instruments. Human beings use a variety of different tools and gadgets to master their mental processes. We call them psychological tools or instruments: Psychological tools are artificial formations. By their nature they are social, not organic or individual. They are directed toward the mastery or control of behavioural processes.....just as technical means are directed toward the control of processes of nature (Vygotsky, 1979). Natural languages, algebraic symbol systems, schemes, diagrams, mechanical drawings and different aspects of IT are some examples of psychological instruments. By using these instruments and making them part of our behavioural processes, they alter the entire flow and structure of mental functions. They do this by forcing us to re-structure our mental functions and activities in accordance with their structure just as for instance using technical tools determine the form of labour operation and thus alter the process of a natural adaptation. Let us look at an example to see how these tools work. "We will look at memory as an example of behavioural process. In the natural way of remembering the direct, natural associative connection between stimuli A and B (i.e. A—B) is automatically stablished. For instance I ( A) will remember [a very important appointment] (B) with my boss. But in the artificial or mnemotechnical case we, using a psychological tool X (e.g., a knot in the handkerchief, a string on [my] finger, a mnemonic scheme or even my software agent), make two new connections, i.e. A—X and X—B, and replace the aforementioned direct connection (A—B) by them. These two new connections are, as in the case of the direct one, products of the properties of the brain. The reason for calling this process and those new connections artificial or instrumental is that we replace the direct connection of (A—B) by them. As a result of this we get the same property but by a different path. For instance, I have to [remember my very important appointment ] ( A—B). I program or design my personal assistant (my software agent) to send me an email with the remark "REMEMBER" (X). When I get that particular email ( A—X), I will come to think of why I asked my personal assistant o send me the reminder, and I eventually will remember the business about [my important appointment] (X—B). I have remembered what I wanted but through a psychological device, my personal assistant. What is new here is that we instead of actively using the natural means of brain tissue, use an artificial direction through a psychological instrument in the outside world to get the same result." (Abolfazlian 1996a) Figure 1. This triangular scheme shows the relationship between natural and artificial behavioural processes. A B |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
