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Why firms pay occasional bribes: the connection economy
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane |
| Copyright Year | 2002 |
| Abstract | This paper suggests that legal business networks facilitate corruption. When the prospects of future deals fail to provide incentives to comply, bribes can be enforced relying on punishments in the network through exclusion. Network members administer the punishments because of the fear that the bureaucrat will retaliate against all network members. The bureaucrat may, for instance, stop revealing his private information to the network. The analysis predicts that the extent of occasional corruption can be larger when the legal and administrative rules are complex and unstable, and if the market is poorly developed. The paper discusses policy measures to reduce corruption. D 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. |
| Starting Page | 47 |
| Ending Page | 60 |
| Page Count | 14 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00068-4 |
| Volume Number | 18 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/lambert/EJPE.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680%2801%2900068-4 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
