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Externalism , Memory , and Self-knowledge
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kraay, Klaas J. |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value. Externalism holds that mental content is individuated by factors external to the subject: “individuating many of a person or animal’s mental kinds – certainly including thoughts about physical objects and properties – is necessarily dependent on relations that the person bears to the physical, or in some cases social, environment” (Burge 1988, 650). This doctrine appears to undermine two extremely plausible claims. First, externalism seems inconsistent with the view that there is a priori self-knowledge. (If mental content is individuated partly by factors external to S, then it seems that S must investigate the external world in order to know her own thoughts.) Second, if externalism rules out selfknowledge, it is also inconsistent with the thesis that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. (Without self-knowledge, privileged access is impossible.)1 Tyler Burge’s inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative selfknowledge (Burge 1998).2 He identifies a class of “cogito-like beliefs”; beliefs of the form “I think (herewith) that writing requires concentration” or “I am thinking that water is a liquid”. Burge considers these to be paradigmatic instances of self-knowledge, and he reasons that in such cases, ... one simultaneously thinks through a first-order thought (that water is a liquid) and thinks about it as one’s own. The content of the first-order (contained) thought is fixed by non-individualistic background conditions. And by its reflexive, selfreferential character, the content of the second-order judgment is logically locked (self-referentially) onto the first-order content which it both contains and takes as its subject matter. Since counterfeit contents logically cannot undermine such selfknowledge, there should be no temptation to think that, in order to have such knowledge, one needs to master its enabling conditions (659-660). Burge’s inclusion theory has been called “...not only the most promising but also the most widely accepted externalist theory of privileged self-knowledge” (Bernecker 1996, 262), but it has nevertheless had its critics. In Part 1, I consider Boghossian’s charge that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I suggest that replies by Peter Ludlow, Sven Bernecker, and Anthony Brueckner fail, but I urge that a different analysis of slow switching can lead to a successful defense of the inclusion theory against Boghossian’s charge. In Part 2, however, I suggest that the inclusion theory has minimal explanatory value. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.ryerson.ca/~kraay/Documents/2002Erk.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://people.ryerson.ca/kraay/Documents/2002Erk.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Cogito (software) Contain (action) Externalism First-order predicate Individuation Irido-corneo-trabecular dysgenesis (disorder) Memory Disorders Mind Physical object Privileged access Rule (guideline) Subject matter expert Turing test Sven Jaschan Thinking, function Tyler Oakley contents - HtmlLinkType explanation |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
