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Auctioning divisible goods
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Wang, James J. D. Zender, Jaime F. |
| Copyright Year | 2002 |
| Abstract | Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction. |
| Starting Page | 673 |
| Ending Page | 705 |
| Page Count | 33 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s001990100191 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wang%20Zender%20(2002)%20-%20Auctioning%20Divisible%20goods.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100191 |
| Volume Number | 19 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |