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Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Pérez-Nievas, Mikel |
| Copyright Year | 2000 |
| Abstract | In this paper. I characterize the set of Bayesian incentive compatible anonymous mechanisms in a discrete public good problem when preferences are private information. With this result in hand, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes in which votes are weighted according to the tax paid by each agent. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/7221/we002107.PDF;jsessionid=288BCB88F56540B6C4091DA35A6F1F9A?sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |