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Equilibrium Selection in n-Person Coordination Games
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kim, Youngse |
| Copyright Year | 1993 |
| Abstract | This paper investigates several approaches to equilibrium selection and the relationships between them. The class of games we study are n-p rson generalized coordination games with multiple Pareto rankable strict Nash equilibria. The main result is that all selection criteria select the same outcome (namely the risk dominant equilibrium) in two-person games, and that most equivalences break for games with more than two players. All criteria select the Pareto efficient equilibrium in voting games, of which pure coordination games are special cases. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C72, D82. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4503.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Genetic Selection Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
