Pluralism and Justified Religious Belief: A Response to Gellman

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Basinger, David
Copyright Year	1996
Abstract	What is the proper epistemic relationship between evidence and religious belief? Must justified religious belief be based on propositional evidence on some sort? Can such evidence be justifiably ignored? Or does the truth lie somewhere in between? According to those currently labeled evidentialists, justified religious belief must be based on propositional evidence in the sense that the believer must be able to produce some sort of argument or positive reason for such belief. That is, justified religious belief must have epistemic credibility (warrant) conferred on it by other propositions whose epistemic status is not in question. However, an increasing number of philosophers of religion now argue that one can justifiably hold religious beliefs without basing such belief on propositional evidence of any type. Alvin Plantinga, for instance, maintains that religious beliefs, for many, are justifiably acquired in a manner analogous to the way our perceptual or auditory beliefs are acquired: we simply find ourselves believing them.
Starting Page	260
Ending Page	265
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
DOI	10.5840/faithphil199613226
Volume Number	13
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1572&context=faithandphilosophy
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/38692/265337/1264424981307/Pluralism+and+Justified+Religious+Belief+-+A+Response+to+Gellman.pdf?token=8BzudJrtWQt4HYvcxcMI4ttATRw%3D
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199613226
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article