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Can You Keep a Secret ? Reputation and Secret Diplomacy in World Politics ⇤
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Yarhi-Milo, Keren Yin, George |
| Copyright Year | 2017 |
| Abstract | This paper explores how and under what conditions secret diplomacy preserves peace during international crises. We present a novel game where private cooperation serves a screening function. We argue that private cooperation gives an adversary the opportunity to earn a reputation for trustworthiness by resisting the temptation to leak information from the adversary. Secret diplomacy, therefore, can be an effective tool of statecraft that allows adversaries to build mutual trust. We call this the screening equilibrium. At the same time, our model reveals that a state may also utilize secret diplomacy to induce an untrustworthy adversary to fake trustworthiness initially by keeping negotiations secret. We refer to this as the collusion equilibrium. We illustrate the logic of the model using three cases: secret negotiations between United States and China leading to Nixon's visit to China; secret diplomacy between Kennedy and Khrushchev over the missiles in Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis; and secret dealings between Reagan and Khomeini during the Iran-Contra affair. This paper contributes to debates on secrecy, information transmission, and reputation in international politics. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kyarhi/files/secrecy.1.22.2018.anonymized.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kyarhi/files/secrecy.8.16.2017.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
