Squaring the circle ? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Hosli, Madeleine O. Moody, Rebecca Donovan, B. G. G. O’
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	Changing the composition and voting system of the Security Council, in an effort to increase the institution’s global legitimacy, is proving to be one of the most difficult hurdles to overcome for the global community of states represented in the United Nations (UN). This paper demonstrates that due to institutional hurdles, it is considerably more difficult today than it was in the early years of the UN to reach a winning coalition in the General Assembly to secure Security Council reform. In addition, the paper analyzes the effects that adapted patterns of voting, as prescribed by recent reform proposals, would have on the distribution of power among UN member states in the Security Council and on the probability that this institution can form a winning coalition, i.e., reach decisions. Our power and decision capacity computations are based on (modified) Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman measures.
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://repub.eur.nl/pub/65715/art-3A10.1007-2Fs11558-011-9101-1.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://serguei.kaniovski.wifo.ac.at/fileadmin/files_kaniovski/pdf/un_reform.pdf
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Computation Face Fairness measure Google Summer of Code Half-Life 2: Episode One Neoplasms, Second Primary Penrose drain Rendering (computer graphics) Rule (guideline) The Circle (file system) Threat (computer) United Nations World War II holder
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article