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Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption, impunity and cover-up
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Núñez, Javier |
| Copyright Year | 2007 |
| Abstract | This paper analyzes the reputation-based incentives of a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) to detect and expose consumer fraud committed by its members, and the members’ incentives to bribe the SRO in exchange for a cover-up to avoid an external punishment. In a corruption-free benchmark, SROs are effective in detecting, exposing and deterring fraud only if exposure yields a reputation gain to the SRO, which depends on consumers inferences about the SRO’s type. However, if this case prevails the member can succeed in bribing the SRO in exchange for a cover-up and impunity. Despite this, a bribed SRO yields more vigilance and lower fraud than no self-regulation at all. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/150285/Can-self.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
