Why Evidentialists Need not Worry About the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Joyce, James M.
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	In their (2012) paper “An Evidentialist Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism” Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson raise a “basic and fundamental” worry about the accuracy argument for probabilism of Joyce (1999) and (2009). The accuracy argument aspires to establish probabilistic coherence as a core normative requirement in an accuracy-centered epistemology for credences 1 . It does this by showing that any system of credences which violates the laws of probability will be accuracy-dominated by an alternative system that is strictly more accurate in every possible world. The argument relies on the key normative premise that accuracy-dominated credal states are categorically forbidden: no matter what other virtues they might possess, holding accuracy-dominated credences is an epistemic sin in every evidential situation. Easwaran and Fitelson object to this uncompromising position, alleging that the pursuit of accuracy can undermine the legitimate epistemic goal of having credences that are well-justified in light of the evidence. In short, they see a conflict between the following two norms:
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Alternate Webpage(s)	http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jjoyce/papers/APA201.pdf
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article