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Stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rationality
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Fanti, Luciano Gori, Luca |
| Copyright Year | 2011 |
| Abstract | The present study analyses the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with managerial sales delegation and bounded rational players. We find that when firms’ owners hire a manager and delegate the output decisions to him, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is more likely to be destabilised (through a flip bifurcation) than when firms maximise profits. Moreover, highly periodicity and deterministic chaos can also occur as the managers’ bonus increases. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33828/1/MPRA_paper_33828.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |