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Executive Incentive Schemes in Initial Public Offerings : The Effects of Multiple Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Allcock, Deborah |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple agency conflicts, this paper examines factors affecting the implementation of equity based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). Using a unique sample of UK IPO companies between years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the “toughness” of executive compensation. The papers interesting findings suggests a number of avenues for a future analysis of governance development process in “threshold” firms. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/4160/2/JoM_RR4_Sept_08_Final_Submission_inc_abstract.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/4160/2/JoM_RR4_Sept_08_Final_Submission_inc_abstract.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Conflict (Psychology) Corporate governance Graph toughness Paper United States Public Health Service |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
