Chapter 13. Fiscal Federalism, Good Governance, and Economic Growth in Mexico

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Careaga, Maite Weingast, Barry R.
Copyright Year	2003
Abstract	Good governance and appropriately designed institutions are now recognized as necessary for economic growth. Yet we know too little about this relationship. Why do some governments protect property rights, provide a stable macroeconomy, and have limited taxes and corruption, while others are corrupt kleptocracies that prey on their citizens? In recent years, a new political economy literature has emerged that studies these questions by investigating the interaction of political institutions and economic performance. Proponents of this approach provide a general if abstract answer to the above questions: A country’s political and institutional framework determines whether government officials face incentives for good or bad governance. As Stiglitz (1998,5) suggests, “misaligned incentives can induce government officials to take actions that are not, in any sense, in the public interest.”
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
DOI	10.1515/9781400845897-015
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://economics-files.pomona.edu/Andrabi/Economic%20Development/Mexico%20Country%20Study.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845897-015
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Chapter