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Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Schneider, Henry S. |
| Copyright Year | 2010 |
| Abstract | AbstractIn this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning. |
| Starting Page | 783 |
| Ending Page | 805 |
| Page Count | 23 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1086/652423 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://works.bepress.com/henry_schneider/2/download/ |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1086/652423 |
| Volume Number | 53 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |