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Reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain with sequential manufacturers ' price competition
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Wang, Wenbin Fan, Lingling Zhang, Peng |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Abstract | This paper examines reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two sequential competing manufact urers. Game theoretic models are developed to investigate both cases: no RPM in the CLSC, and RPM with government is implemented in the CLSC. Equilibrium Nash solutions are obtained and the conditions under which RPM is effective are investigated. Results indicate that: (i) RPM lowers the wholesale price and the re tail price, while it boosts the sales quantity, profits of the manufacturers, the retaile r, and the total profit of CLSC as well as the collection rate. (ii) The collection rate of the follower manufacturer enhances with the incremental substitute coefficient, wherea s it does not have effect on the leader manufacturer. (iii) All participants in the CLSC will make ever-increasing profits only when products’ substitute coefficient is lower than certain values. Additionally, RPM keeps the market competitive orde r since it protects the wholesale price of the leader’s market leading stat u . |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/86082.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Coefficient Increment Nash equilibrium Ravens colored progressive matrices Revolutions per minute Tail call Theory |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
