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Technology Transfer in a Stackelberg Structure : Licensing Contracts and Welfare
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kabiraj, Tarun |
| Copyright Year | 2002 |
| Abstract | suggestions made by an anonymous referee of this journal. However, the usual disclaimer applies here. Abstract This paper studies the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discusses its welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of the contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.isical.ac.in/~eru/erudp/2002-04.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lezag/Workshops/revstackelberg.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Aggregate data Appendix Assumed Charge (electrical) Circa Contract agreement Fees Holder Device Component Large Legal patent Mathematical optimization N(4)-chloroacetylcytosine arabinoside Occur (action) Optimization problem Rapid Refresh Round-robin scheduling Rule (guideline) Social Welfare Structured Product Labeling Licensing Terminology Technology Transfer disclaimer |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
