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Why buy when you can rent?
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Bonneau, Joseph |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Abstract | The Bitcoin cryptocurrency introduced a novel distributed consensus mechanism relying on economic incentives. While a coalition controlling a majority of computational power may undermine the system, for example by double-spending funds, it is often assumed it would be incentivized not to attack to protect its long-term stake in the health of the currency. We show how an attacker might purchase mining power (perhaps at a cost premium) for a short duration via bribery. Indeed, bribery can even be performed in-band with the system itself enforcing the bribe. A bribing attacker would not have the same concerns about the long-term health of the system, as their majority control is inherently short-lived. New modeling assumptions are needed to explain why such attacks have not been observed in practice. The need for all miners to avoid short-term profits by accepting bribes further suggests a potential tragedy of the commons which has not yet been analyzed. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1021/cen-09438-bus2 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.jbonneau.com/doc/B16a-BITCOIN-why_buy_when_you_can_rent.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
