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Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Davies, Stephen Olczak, Matthew |
| Copyright Year | 2010 |
| Abstract | This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy). This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore pre-merger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’ merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance. |
| Starting Page | 83 |
| Ending Page | 99 |
| Page Count | 17 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11151-010-9259-3 |
| Volume Number | 37 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8256111/CCP+Working+paper+08-28.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://publications.aston.ac.uk/18465/1/Assessing_the_efficacy_of_structural_merger_remedies.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://publications.aston.ac.uk/18470/1/Assessing_the_efficacy_of_structural_merger_remedies.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107583/pb08-28.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9259-3 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
