Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Zhang, Jianlei Chu, Tianguang Weissing, Franz J.
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	In a public goods game, cooperation can be a stable outcome if defectors are facing efficient punishment. In some public goods systems, punishment is undermined by an insurance system where speculators buy a policy that sequentially covers all punishment costs. Here, we study a simple model to investigate the question whether stable cooperation can break down in the presence of such speculation. We do indeed find scenarios where speculation either leads to the reduction of the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium or even the loss of stability of this equilibrium. This however only happens if the costs of the insurance are lower than the expected fines faced by a defector. We argue that an insurance of this type is not viable and conclude that under realistic assumptions speculation does not destabilize cooperation.
Starting Page	78
Ending Page	82
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
DOI	10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019
PubMed reference number	23291010
Journal	Medline
Volume Number	321
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://www.rug.nl/research/gelifes/tres/publications/_pdf/zh_eajtb13.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019
Journal	Journal of theoretical biology
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article