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Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Gorelkina, Olga |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders’ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.2487743 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2014_10online.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2487743 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |