Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Lebrun, Bernard
Copyright Year	1999
Abstract	Summary. Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.
Starting Page	435
Ending Page	453
Page Count	19
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
DOI	10.1007/s001990100227
Volume Number	20
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://page-one.springer.com/pdf/preview/10.1007/s001990100227
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100227
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article