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The Detection of Malingering on Measures of Competency to Stand Trial: A Study of Coached and Uncoached Simulators
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Springman, Rachael E. |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | The present study investigated the detection of coached and uncoached malingering on two measures of competency to stand trial: the Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT) and the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial – Revised (ECST-R). Using a simulation research design, undergraduates (n = 101) were randomly assigned into Control (instructed to respond honestly), Uncoached Malingerer (instructed to feign incompetency but did not receive any tips to elude detection), and Coached Malingerer groups (instructed to feign incompetency and received tips to elude detection) and presented with a hypothetical criminal case scenario that required them to undergo an evaluation of their competency to stand trial. Scores on the GCCT and the ECST-R Factual Scale served as indicators of competency, while scores on the GCCT Atypical Presentation (AP) and ECST-R Atypical Presentation (ATP) scales served as indicators of malingering. As expected, results indicate that the two malingering groups appeared markedly impaired on overall competency scores in comparison to the Control group. Furthermore, the two malingering groups appeared markedly elevated on malingering scale scores in comparison to the Control group. Contrary to expectations, test-strategy coaching exerted little impact on competency and malingering scale scores. Both malingering scales effectively discriminated between malingerers and honest responders. Springman, Rachael, 2007, UMSL, p. 3 The Detection of Malingering on Measures of Competency to Stand Trial: A Study of Coached and Uncoached Simulators Competency to stand trial serves as one of the most significant mental health issues in the criminal justice system, and evaluations of competency to stand trial serve as the most frequently requested forensic evaluation (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997; Nicholson & Kugler, 1991). In fact, recent estimates suggest that 60,000 defendants are referred for competency evaluations each year, and defense attorneys initiate the competency inquiry in approximately 8% to 15% of their felony cases (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress, & Monahan, 1992; Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress, Monahan, Eisenberg, & Feucht-Haviar, 1997; Melton et al., 1997b; Poythress, Bonnie, Hoge, Monahan, & Oberlander, 1994). The prevalence of these evaluations, coupled with the serious implications that decisions about competency inevitably hold for the parties to the legal proceedings, highlights the importance of investigating factors that impact the validity of competency evaluations performed by mental health professionals. Mental health professionals play an important role in the legal competency decision, as evidenced by forensic clinical researchers’ attempts to translate “the legal construct of fitness into psychological terms to assess and measure it” (Hart & Hare, 1992, p. 55). Contemporary definitions of trial competency maintain that an individual must be competent to participate in the criminal process, such that “only the acts of an autonomous individual are to be recognized by society” (Melton et al., 1997, p. 119). The assurance of a fair trial serves as a core objective of the modern American justice system, and one that dates back to 17 century English common law. In Dusky v. United States (1960), the United States Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision that established the modern standard for the definition of competency to stand trial. In Springman, Rachael, 2007, UMSL, p. 4 the judgment, the Supreme Court opined that “it is not enough . . . that ‘the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of the events,’ but that the ‘test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’” (Dusky v. United States, 1960). The Dusky standard has emerged as the predominant standard in the field of forensic psychology, and clinicians have generally adopted the definition of the competency construct that has been delineated by legal authorities: a factual understanding of the proceedings, a rational understanding of the proceedings, and an ability to consult with counsel (Rogers, Grandjean, Tillbrook, Vitacco, & Sewell, 2001). Studies have clearly demonstrated that judicial authorities rely heavily upon the expert testimony of the psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers called upon to perform competency evaluations (e.g., Reich & Tookey, 1986; Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, Wheeles, & Ronan, 2004). In fact, courts often defer to the findings in the report and proceed without holding a formal competency hearing (Cox & Zapf, 2004; Grisso, 2003; Zapf et al., 2004). Qualitative research reveals that judges believe “that mental health professionals are more qualified (through their specific training) to answer the question of competency than are judges or other legal professionals” (Zapf et al., 2004, p. 35). The serious implications associated with these judgments – individuals’ rights, liberty, due process – require that the competency inquiry be performed with the highest level of proficiency and integrity. To that end, researchers have increasingly emphasized the importance of the assessment of malingering to increase the validity of the clinical opinions offered in competency evaluations (Skeem & Golding, 1998). Springman, Rachael, 2007, UMSL, p. 5 Competency Evaluations Malingering The DSM defines malingering as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p.739). In a nonforensic context, mental health professionals generally accept their clients’ reports of presenting problems and symptomatology as genuine and legitimate. Competency evaluations, however, occur within a forensic context, and the motivation of defendants to deceive or distort their presentation requires assessment by the practitioner (Schlesinger, 2003). The distinct types of referral questions in traditional clinical settings versus competency cases can manifest very different examination techniques. For example, traditional clinical cases typically focus on “how a patient perceives or feels about the world – what is real to that patient – not factual or historical truth” (Hunsley & Bailey, 1999, p. 53). Forensic clinicians, however, seek to render clinical opinions based on historically accurate events that have been corroborated using multiple sources of information. Consequently, the emphasis on reliable and valid historical data is of paramount importance in competency evaluations; and in contrast to therapeutic settings, the response style of the defendant is not assumed to be reliable (Heilbrun, 2001). Although only limited information exists regarding the base rates of malingering in competency evaluations, studies have shown that clinicians diagnose malingering in pre-trial evaluations between 8% and 15% of the time (Cornell & Hawk, 1989; Rogers, Sewell, & Goldstein, 1994). Moreover, it does not appear that evaluators routinely rule out malingering as part of their assessments. For example, one study found that 88% of the reports in their sample Springman, Rachael, 2007, UMSL, p. 6 failed to articulate that they ruled out malingering as part of their assessments (Skeem, Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998). In addition, researchers report a dearth of systematized studies on malingering in competency evaluations within the past 30 years despite the acknowledged problem of defendants’ motivation to feign mental illness to delay their trials, mitigate their sentences, and divert their commitments from jails to forensic hospitals (Cornell & Hawk, 1989; Cruise & Rogers, 1998; Jaffe & Sharma, 1998; Rogers et al., 2002). Coaching in Competency Evaluations Experts assert that motivated malingerers likely prepare their dissimulations to evade detection by clinicians (Rogers, 1997). Clearly, the stakes are high in competency evaluations, and those determined to malinger incompetency may seek out coaching to maximize their chances for success. Victor and Abeles (2004) define coaching as “any attempt to alter the results of psychological or neuropsychological tests in such a way that distorts the true representation of the examinee’s cognitive, emotional, or behavioral status or hinders an accurate assessment of such attributes” (p. 374). Experts agree that the effectiveness of psychological tests depends upon the naiveté of the examinee to the instruments and how they work (Ruiz, Drake, Glass, Marctotte, & van Gorp, 2002; Youngjohn, 1995). Consequently, the phenomenon of coaching raises substantial concern in the context of competency evaluations. Coaching may render a malingerer’s distortion difficult to detect by a clinician during a competency evaluation, thus jeopardizing the validity of the clinician’s conclusions and recommendations. Given the significant influence that mental health professionals have on judicial decisions about competency, invalid clinical conclusions due to undetected malingering during an evaluation have serious implications on the outcome of competency hearings and subsequent legal proceedings. Springman, Rachael, 2007, UMSL, p. 7 Despite efforts to safeguard psychological test materials from the general public, motivated malingerers can obtain a significant amount of information about tests and procedures prior to evaluations, particularly from the Internet and their attorneys. This information includes sample test items, symptom details, diagnostic criteria for specific disorders, and test-taking strategies (Nichols & Greene, 1997; Rogers, 1997; Rogers et al., 1993; Ruiz et al., 2002). Given the lack of monitoring and control over the i |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1037/e617962012-524 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://irl.umsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1550&context=dissertation |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1037/e617962012-524 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
