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Draft – May 20 , 2016 Welfare Maximization Entices Participation Note
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Hofbauer, Johannes |
| Copyright Year | 2016 |
| Abstract | We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two corollaries of our results are characterizations of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to Moulin’s well-known no show paradox (J. of Econ. Theory, 45, 53–64, 1988), which shows that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://dss.in.tum.de/files/brandt-research/mlpart.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
