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Three: Family Time, Cliffs, and Train Wrecks: Recalling California's State Budget
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Hirsch, Werner Zvi Mitchell, Daniel |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | FAMILY TIME, CLIFFS, AND TRAIN WRECKS: RECALLING CALIFORNIA'S STATE BUDGET * Werner Z. Hirsch, UCLA Professor Emeritus Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Ho-su Wu Professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management & Department of Policy Studies, UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research “I look forward to other opportunities that will allow me to spend more time with my family.” Tim Gage on being replaced as State Finance Director 1 “I have never been so frightened about California's future as I am now. The ingredients seem to be here to take the state right over the cliff.” Democratic State Senator John Vasconcellos 2 “Without bipartisan cooperation, we are headed for a fiscal train wreck.” Republican Assemblyman Keith Richman 3 California's long-term budgetary problems, related to demographic and other trends, have been well documented since at least the mid-1990s. However, the budget crisis of the early 2000s was linked to the downturn in the business cycle and the stock market. The State spent cyclical peak and windfall revenues as if they were permanent. Deficits were thus inevitable as these revenues declined. The focus of discussions on remedies to avert future crises has been on the Legislature and the constitutional institutions surrounding it, notably the two thirds vote requirement for budgets and tax increases and term limits. But the public so far has not shown enthusiasm for relaxing constraints such as term limits. Indeed, it has approved constraints on legislative action, most notably to fund K-14 education. Further along that approach are proposals for tightened constitutional spending caps that would limit legislative appropriations or mandated balanced budgets. An alternative approach to changing legislative institutions would be to give the Governor greater budgetary authority such as making the official gubernatorial budget proposal the default budget in the event of legislative stalemate. The 2003 recall movement against Governor Davis suggests that the public already regards the Governor as the key budgetary official. Yet under current constitutional arrangements, the Governor's role is largely limited to proposing a budget and signing one after the Legislature acts. This chapter was written shortly after the October 7, 2003 recall election. It does not reflect budgetary developments thereafter. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt4rx0c06j/qt4rx0c06j.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
