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Cournot Competition under Uncertainty ∗
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Grimm, Veronika |
| Copyright Year | 2008 |
| Abstract | We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertainty is resolved after production has taken place but prior to the sales decision, which is often referred to as the free disposal case. Production is higher under free disposal than in any equilibrium of the game without free disposal. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/ForschungPublikationen/VG_2008_Cournet.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
