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Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Mauleon, Ana Vannetelbosch, Vincent |
| Copyright Year | 2003 |
| Abstract | Abstract.We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium. |
| Starting Page | 307 |
| Ending Page | 316 |
| Page Count | 10 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10108-003-0069-8 |
| Volume Number | 5 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/~mauleon/ser2003.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-003-0069-8 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
