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Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Houba, Harold Lomwel, Gijsbert Van |
| Copyright Year | 1998 |
| Abstract | Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in a simple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding to militant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. Necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonic convergence to a unique steady state are derived. Otherwise, cyclic behaviour of wage shares is inevitable. A wage decrease can occur if strike is credible, but never when strike is not credible. In the limit, as time between bargaining rounds vanishes, this paradox survives. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/85444/1/98115.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/1760152/counterintuitiveresultsina2001.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/32873/counterintuitiveresultsina2001.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/9301/98115.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Contract agreement Convergence (action) Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Non-monotonic logic Steady state |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |