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Adaptive Investment Strategies During Financial Crises and the Role of Corruption: An Experiment with Financial Professionals
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Paserman, M. Daniele |
| Copyright Year | 2016 |
| Abstract | I employ experimental methods to study the way financial professionals adapt investment strategies in sovereign-bonds during financial crises. I find that when the complexity of the environment increases, investors reduce information processing and shift to strategies in which they systematically focus on a selective subset of bond aspects, neglecting information considered as relevant during “normal” times. The issuer's level of corruption is found to be an aspect on which investors anchor during crises. I suggest that this mechanism makes corrupt emerging markets more prone to bond sell-off and comovement with global markets when investor sentiment deteriorates. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.2731507 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.webster.ch/academics/research/files/pasermanfeb2016.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731507 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |