Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Online Appendix for When Should Sellers Use Auctions?
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Roberts, James W. Sweeting, Andrew |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | This Appendix shows that the entry thresholds, beliefs of potential entrants and jump bidding functions defined in the text form an equilibrium and is the only equilibrium consistent with our refinement assumptions. For clearer exposition, we begin with a two period game and show the there exists a unique equilibrium under the D1 refinement. We extend the result to games with more than two rounds by showing how a recursive application of the same arguments leads to the uniqueness of bidding and entry rules in earlier rounds. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/articles-attachments/aer/data/aug2013/20110814_app.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
