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Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Johnston, Jason |
| Copyright Year | 2005 |
| Abstract | This paper analyzes polluters’ incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.881068 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=faculty_scholarship |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=faculty_scholarship&httpsredir=1&referer= |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.881068 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |