Canaries in a coal mine: California physician groups and competition.

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Casalino, Lawrence P.
Copyright Year	2001
Abstract	Health care organizations may compete by developing organized processes to improve quality and increase efficiency, or may focus on growing to increase negotiating leverage and on controlling costs through withholding appropriate care and avoiding sick patients. This paper describes key ways in which public and private policy decisions create incentives that influence the competitive focus of physician groups in California, a state in which physician groups and health maintenance organizations are prevalent. These policies do not manage competition in optimal ways: They reward groups for market leverage and controlling costs while failing to fully reward quality and efficiency.
Starting Page	97
Ending Page	108
Page Count	12
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20H/PDF%20HAjulaug2001Casalino.pdf
PubMed reference number	11463095v1
Volume Number	20
Issue Number	4
Journal	Health affairs
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Coal Patients Serinus Women's Health Services
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article