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The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Booth, Richard A. |
| Copyright Year | 1989 |
| Abstract | The efficiency and effectiveness of federal tender offer law takes on added importance in light of the increased frequency of both friendly and hostile tender offers. Professor Booth suggests that federal tender offer law effectively favors the bidder at the expense of the target company and discusses potential solutions to this lack of evenhandedness. He argues that current federal law-especially the Williams Act-unduly encourages shareholders to tender, and that parties to tender offers can and often do avoid the Act altogether, thereby negating its protections. Professor Booth considers the dangers of one potential solution, repealing the Act. He determines that the Act's repeal could prove harmful to smaller target companies. He proposes that solutions to the problem take into account the varying needs of different target companies, and weighs the merits offederal law, stock exchange regulation, and state law. He concludes that state law is at this time the most promising source of reform for takeover regulation. |
| Starting Page | 707 |
| Ending Page | 707 |
| Page Count | 1 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.15779/Z386144 |
| Volume Number | 77 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1856&context=californialawreview |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.15779/Z386144 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
