Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
The first workshop on pricing and incentives in networks (WPIN 2012)
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Loiseau, Patrick |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | Today’s communication networks are highly complex and heterogeneous, and are often owned by multiple profit-making entities. For new technologies or infrastructure designs to be adopted, they must not be only based on sound engineering performance considerations but also present the right economic incentives. Recent changes in regulations of the telecommunication industry make such economic considerations even more urgent. For instance, new concerns such as network neutrality have a significant impact on the evolution of communication networks. On the other hand, communication networks support an ever growing economic activity based on applications and services such as cloud computing, social networks, peer-to-peer networks, etc. These applications pose new challenges such as the development of good pricing mechanisms taking into account the network characteristics. In relation to these applications, security and privacy also require consideration of economic aspects to be fully understood. The aim of the first Workshop on Pricing and Incentives in Networks was to foster discussions on the application of economic and game-theoretic models and principles to address challenges in the development of networks and networkbased applications and services. We received 24 submissions, all of which were reviewed by at least 3 members of the program committee (in most cases by 4 members). Based on the reviews, we selected 10 papers that were presented at the workshop. The presentations were organized in 4 sessions: Neutrality, Pricing and QoS, Transit and Peering, and Infrastructure and Network Formation. In the Neutrality session, Coucheney et al. discuss the neutrality issue for search engines. They propose a simple model for a single keyword and perform numerical comparisons of the revenues in the neutral and non-neutral regimes. Their paper is among the first attempts to analyze quantitatively the effect of non-neutrality in search engines. Hanawal et al. analyze the incentive for a content provider (CP) and an ISP to collude by means of an exclusive contract in a simple model with one ISP and several CPs. They show that the collusion is beneficial to the colluding CP if its advertisement revenue is sufficiently high relative to that of other CPs. In the Pricing and QoS session, Yu and Kim propose two subsidy schemes (price subsidy and QoS subsidy) to improve user welfare in a mobile network. They analyze the effect of each scheme on user welfare and on network service provider |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://lig-membres.imag.fr/loiseapa/pdfs/2012/editorial_WPIN2012_2.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.eurecom.fr/en/publication/3816/download/rs-publi-3816.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
