Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions ?

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Becht, Marco Polo, Andrea Rossi, Stefano
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	Can shareholder voting prevent managers from destroying value in corporate acquisitions? Previous studies based on U.S. data are inconclusive because shareholder consent is discretionary. We study the U.K. where such approval is mandatory for deals that exceed a multivariate relative size threshold. We find that in the U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting shareholders lost $3 billion. U.S. acquirers lost $214 billion in matched deals during the same period. Differences-in-differences and a multidimensional regression discontinuity design lend further support to a causal interpretation. Our evidence suggests that mandatory voting makes acquirers more likely to refrain from overpaying.
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://intra.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/rossis/Published%20Papers/wp1.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2015/retrieve.php?pdfid=1014
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/subjects/finance/events/seminars/mandatory_shareholder_voting_27_september_2014.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://bschool.huji.ac.il/.upload/staff/SSRN-id2443792.pdf
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Acquiring bank Aggregate data Causal filter Constraint (mathematics) Discretionary access control Mandatory - HL7DefinedRoseProperty Reflections of signals on conducting lines
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article