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Borda rule is intended also for dishonest men
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Lehtinen, Aki |
| Copyright Year | 2005 |
| Abstract | This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in Borda rule by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies in simulated voting games under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Utilitarian efficiency is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour. Strategic voting increases utilitarian efficiency particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types and if the voters have at least some aggregate level information on preference intensities. Borda rule is shown to have two advantages related to strategic voting. Strategic voting is beneficial in this rule even if some but not all voter types engage in strategic behaviour and strategic voting is beneficial even if the voters' information is based on unreliable signals if those signals contain some intensity information. (JEL classification numbers: D71, D81) |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://congress.utu.fi/epcs2006/docs/A2_lehtinen.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
