Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Chen, C. R. Steiner, Thomas L. Whyte, Ann Marie |
| Copyright Year | 2006 |
| Abstract | Abstract We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. The results are robust across alternative risk measures, statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Overall, our results support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Our results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the risk levels of banks. |
| Starting Page | 915 |
| Ending Page | 945 |
| Page Count | 31 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004 |
| Volume Number | 30 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://academic.udayton.edu/carlchen/Chan%20Research/JBF2006.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/18260.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |