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Uma Resposta Incompatibilista Ao Problema Do Determinismo E Da Responsabilidade Moral
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Fachin, Patricia Ribolli |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Abstract | Traditionally, the attribution of moral responsibility depended on a commitment to the existence of free will, understood in a rather general way as the "capacity to act otherwise". However, since the publication of Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility by Harry G. Frankfurt in 1969, such a thesis has been called into question, and some philosophers have argued that it is possible to attribute moral responsibility even if determinism is true. In order to respond to this attempt to reconcile moral responsibility with determinism, Peter van Inwagen argues that the Principle of Possible Prevention – PPP demonstrates that the existence of moral responsibility depends on a commitment to a metaphysical thesis of free will. Hence, this article has two objectives: on the one hand, to expose the compatibilist and incompatibilist positions on moral responsibility and determinism defended by Frankfurt and van Inwagen and, on the other hand, to present a reason why the non commitment with a metaphysical notion of free will creates an ethical problem. Hence, the article is divided in four parts: in the first, I will make a brief reconstruction of the problem of the compatibilism between free will and determinism, of which the problem of the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism is a subproblem; in the second, I will present Frankfurt's argument, which gave rise to the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism; in the third, I will present the Principle of Possible Prevention (PPP) formulated by Peter van Inwagen, as an incompatibilist 1 Mestranda em Filosofia na Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos – UNISINOS. E-mail: prfachin@unisinos.br Uma resposta incompatibilista 243 Kínesis, Vol. XI, n° 28, julho 2019, p.242-262 reply to Frankfurt's thesis;, finally, I will justify why the non-commitment to a metaphysical thesis of free will has ethical implications. |
| Starting Page | 242 |
| Ending Page | 262 |
| Page Count | 21 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.36311/1984-8900.2019.v11.n28.16.p242 |
| Volume Number | 11 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/kinesis/article/download/9144/5811 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2019.v11.n28.16.p242 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
